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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
This paper provides a detailed comparison of both the institutional frameworks and the societal 
manifestation of xenophobic sentiments in Central and Eastern Europe. Arguing that xenophobia is 
co-produced at the institutional, discursive, and social levels, the paper analyzes a multitude of 
variables – including national legal frameworks, administrative practices, available scientific data and 
media discourses – and points out the differences between the country-specific operationalizations of 
the core concepts. Its primary goal is to examine the possible roots of xenophobia, and to identify the 
main reasons behind the associated commonalities and differences.  
The analysis stresses that sociological surveys prove false the simplistic notion that the region is 
homogeneously xenophobic: while ethnic intolerance increased in countries such as Poland, Russia, 
Belarus, and Hungary between 1990 and 1999, it decreased in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Romania, and Slovakia. Given that xenophobia levels don’t seem to be correlated to living standards, 
cultural-historical experience, education, civil society patterns, or even the number of immigrants, the 
paper suggests that more attention should be paid to the role of political communication and public 
discourse. 
In Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, a pro-immigrant discourse has been introduced into 
the mainstream media by political elites and NGO activists, and in most countries the nationalistic or 
ethnocentric discourse appear to have been tied to particular leaders. Conversely, in Hungary the 
public debate on foreigners has been dominated by negative and stereotypical imagery, and the 
rhetorical de-territorialization of “the nation” has become widely accepted across the political 
spectrum. These factors have contributed to the development and preservation in Hungary of a more 
monolithically xenophobic public discourse than in other countries. 
Even though the results of comparative international surveys diverge in many aspects – and 
sometimes even contradict each other – one of the shared conclusions has been that Hungary has 
developed the most negative overall indicators over the past decade. In one international study, 45% 
of Hungarian respondents were classed as “strongly xenophobic”, and local surveys show that most 
Hungarians are concerned about immigration from both the “East” and the “West”. At the same 
time, Hungary has lost its front-runner position in finding a legal solution to the growing problem. 
The paper warns that the Hungarian government’s failure to embark on the adoption of a 
comprehensive immigration policy will place it in a weaker position than the Czechs or the Poles, in 
influencing the design of the EU’s emerging legal framework. 
Until recently, most countries in the region have treated immigration on an ad hoc basis, 
determined by economic pressure, “national” or ethnic solidarity, or EU requirements. However, 
largely due to the preparation for European accession, immigration legislation has gradually become 
both more restrictive and more coherent. At the same time, most countries have not yet recognized 
the need to adopt comprehensive immigration policies (the notable exceptions are Russia, the Czech 
Republic and Poland). The paper argues that despite the low number of immigrants and refugees, the 
national legislations and the dominant political discourse on foreigners has generated an institutional 
spirit which exceeds the legal limits of discrimination between citizens and non-citizens.  
The paper details country-specific findings ranging from the Russian perceptions of the Chinese, 
to Polish perceptions of Romanians and Ukrainians, and Hungarian perceptions of ethnic Hungarian 
migrants from neighboring countries. It analyzes the variations on the status of foreigners, reviews the 
definitions of minorities, compares the diverse forms of anti-discrimination and hate-speech 
legislation, and studies the treatment of refugees, asylum-seekers and legal foreign residents. Among 
the many weaknesses of national legal frameworks, the paper identifies as their basic flaws their 
contradictory nature, the lacking of integration provisions, and the fact that their structure and 
language largely reflects a conception of non-citizens as a group to be “controlled”.  
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The analysis concludes with the interpretation of data collected through xenophobia 
measurement surveys in various countries. In a separate recommendations section, it argues that it is 
the respective governments’ responsibility to work toward changing public discourse to de-criminalize 
migration, to enforce media ethics codes, as well as to extend the enforcement of anti-discrimination 
laws and other instruments of minority protection to foreign citizens. Among others, the paper also 
recommends the development of comprehensive migration policies and the redesigning of education 
and cultural policy, in particular the teaching of history, to recognize diversity. 
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1 .  Th e  Unde r p i nn i ng s  o f  X enophob i a  in  t h e  R eg i on  
Xenophobia – the hatred or non-acceptance of otherness in the broad sense, or of foreigners in the 
narrower sense – in Eastern Europe (defined here as the former state socialist countries of Europe) is 
usually attributed to cultural traditions or the economic and social shocks of transition. However, 
xenophobic practices and discourses in society not just inform but also are informed by (1) political 
and media discourses on otherness and (2) legally based and institutionally practiced exclusion of 
immigrants.  
While intolerance toward minorities is regarded as a key social, political and indeed security 
problem in the region, unlike in Western Europe or North America, it is rarely linked to migration. 
The division between “immigrant” and “indigenous” or “historical” minorities recognizes - at least on 
paper - the need to support the latter but excludes the former from debates on social and cultural 
issues, reducing them to an issue of policing. This division has enabled the institutionalization and 
amplification of xenophobic political agendas in Eastern Europe and thereby contributed to a more 
general climate of intolerance, which has hit indigenous minorities as well.  
With this thesis as a starting point, the Center for Policy Studies and the Humanities Center of 
Central European University held a workshop, “Understanding Xenophobia in Eastern Europe,” on 
21-22 June 2002. The workshop revealed both commonalities and substantial differences in the 
trends of xenophobia in the region and raised questions of data interpretation. Based on contributions 
to the workshop as well as a review of previously available studies and information, this report 
compares the institutionalization and practice of intolerance primarily of immigrant minorities (and 
foreigners in general) in Hungary to the situation in other countries the region, and attempts to point 
to possible reasons behind commonalities and differences. In so doing, it wishes to add to existing 
studies of intolerance toward indigenous minorities (e.g Ethnic Relations 2001) another important 
policy dimension that must be addressed in any approach to the wider issue of intolerance in society. 
With increasing flows of migration, investment, and tourism in the region, xenophobia is 
becoming an important phenomenon and policy issue. The nation-state in Eastern Europe, as 
everywhere else, defines its sovereignty through a legal framework that institutionally discriminates 
against and excludes foreigners. Restrictions on entry, residence, employment, investment, social 
welfare etc. constitute institutional exclusion justified in terms of the nation-state. Such exclusion 
creates a double standard not only in the political, economic and social rights of individuals and in 
their administrative treatment but also in the dominant discourse. Mobility, activity, readiness to 
move to find a better job or to create jobs for others are encouraged in developed and democratic 
societies, but only for citizens of the country in question and of a few other similarly developed 
countries. In the meantime, when citizens of the “third world,” or an often arbitrarily defined list of 
countries, follow the same patterns of social behavior they are condemned, punished, and discursively 
criminalized. 
Yet while the double standard may make legal sense, society at large has difficulties reconciling 
these anti-migration policies with the generally declared universal principles of equality and 
acceptance of diversity. For “common people,” affiliation with another state and different citizenship 
are not the crucial factors. Rather, immigrants are perceived as “others” in a cultural and linguistic 
sense. The rhetoric of migration control, which portrays these “others” as a threat to society, 
counteracts and undermines lofty ideals of universal equality.  
While legal exclusion is universal, there are two substantive issues that differentiate, first, 
countries of Western and Eastern Europe in general, and, second, Eastern European countries 
between each other. The first issue is the existence or absence of a managed program of immigration. 
Several Western European countries, recognizing their need for labor, have recently begun such 
programs, and European Union efforts to develop a common immigration policy (as outlined in the 
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European Commission’s Communication “Toward a Community Immigration Policy”, 
COM(2000)757 of 22 November 2000) include the recognition of a need for such. By contrast, in 
Eastern Europe, only Russian and, in part, Czech policy recognizes the need for managed 
immigration. The second issue is to what extent legal exclusion of immigrants informs public 
discourse and social behavior. This issue has to do, among other factors, with the inclusion or 
exclusion of immigrants from social integration policies and programs.  
In light of the above, xenophobia must be seen as co-produced at the institutional, discursive, and 
social levels, and its treatment requires an examination of legal frameworks as well as administrative 
practices alongside with media discourses, sociological surveys, and data on ethnic violence.  
1.1 Legal Basis  
Approach to minority ethnic groups in Eastern Europe, as in Western Europe, is determined by a 
strong dichotomy between “indigenous” and “immigrant”. While the historical origins and sizes of 
groups classified as “immigrant” varies widely – from ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia who have 
not been granted local citizenship, to Chinese in Hungary – the legal and discursive justification of 
discrimination against these groups is similar. This dichotomy allows for a politically directed 
institutionalization of xenophobia that obfuscates common problems of minorities and creates a basis 
of xenophobic discourse and practice.  
An examination of the legal basis of xenophobia includes, therefore, three elements: (1) 
Immigration legislation and related laws that institutionalize discrimination between citizens and 
non-citizens; (2) Legislation defining titular and indigenous ethnic groups that institutionalize 
discrimination between ethnic groups (in some countries); and (3) Anti-discrimination legislation and 
possible legislation on minorities or diasporas (in the case of immigrants of the same ethnicity as the 
main population of the accepting country) that may counteract such discrimination.  
1.1.1 Immigration and Asylum Legislation and Related Laws 
Russia 
The legal framework regulating the status of foreigners shows considerable variation across Eastern 
Europe. Nonetheless, certain common features can be identified.  
Russia stands out among Eastern European countries as the state with a comprehensive migration 
policy, which, however, operates in parallel with an ambitious, but disjointed and dysfunctional, 
legislative framework. Russia created a Federal Migration Service to cope primarily with ethnic 
Russian refugees and forced migrants from the other successor states, but also with huge numbers of 
other, particularly Afghan, refugees. (It was, however, dissolved in 2000.) A Federal Migration 
Program was also enacted in 1992 and has been periodically reviewed (the latest version is for the 
period from 2002 to 2004). Demographers have participated in the work on these programs, which, 
beyond dealing with refugees, have addressed migration processes holistically, accepting it a necessary 
phenomenon. The successive programs note both opportunities and difficulties brought about by 
migration; they review emigration, immigration, internal migration, the demographic and labor 
situation, social and economic integration, and issues of intolerance and welfare. They provide for 
yearly quotas on refugees as well as ensuring their non-refoulement (Voronina 1998:48). 
The government formed a Commission on Migration Policy in 1998 and adopted a new White 
paper (kontseptsiia) on migration policy in 2001. The document issued by the Minister of Federation 
Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy (Blokhin 2001) notes the need to develop a selective, 
quota-based immigration policy (pp. 8-9). Likewise, Russia's Nationalities Minister said "Russia needs 
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an influx of foreign labor but wants it to be an organized process" (Migration News 2002). Laws have 
been enacted “On the process of leaving and entering the Russian Federation,” “On the legal status of 
foreign citizens in the Russian Federation,” “On displaced persons,” “On refugees”, and “On 
citizenship of the Russian Federation”. A 1993 presidential Statute “On the recruitment and 
utilization of foreign labor in the Russian Federation” enabled regional administrations to set quotas 
for the use of foreign labor, which particularly those in Siberia and the Russian Far East have used. 
There is a quota for employment of foreign workers (583,000 in 2003). Overall, this legislation 
privileges Russian citizens: either “forced migrants” or persons displaced from their residence in other 
post-Soviet countries or internal migrants. Russia has ratified a CIS Agreement on cooperation in the 
area of labor migration and on the social protection of labor migration and signed bilateral 
agreements on labor migration with a number of countries including Ukraine, China, and Vietnam 
(Voronina 1998:42-49).  
These laws, however, are not always consistent with the federal migration policy, with Article 62 
of the Russian constitution, which declares that “foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Russian 
Federation enjoy the same rights and carry the same obligations as citizens of the Russian Federation, 
except cases defined in federal laws or international treaties,” or with international conventions. Thus, 
the 1997 Law  “On refugees” states that illegally leaving his or her country of habitual residence can 
disqualify an asylum applicant from receiving a substantive evaluation of his or her application 
(Yastrebova 1998:81). 
In addition, the actual status of foreigners is largely defined by federal and regional regulations on 
entry, entrepreneurship, labor, and household registration outside the purview of these laws. Federal 
and regional regulations - these include not only laws but also decrees and even unpublished circulars 
by the President, regional administration heads, and the central and regional governments – often 
clash. In particular, a number of regional administrations, including Moscow, have issued decrees 
limiting the recognition of refugees, their freedom of movement and of choice of residence, or issuing 
quotas for their number (Khoperskaya 1998:137-38). For example, Law 9-K3 of 1995 of the 
Krasnodar Region (invalidated by a federal court, but still applied) stipulates that the region’s 
Migration Service recognizes an asylum applicant as a refugee only if he or she has immediate relatives 
who have resided in the region for at least ten years. The law makes residential registration 
compulsory for everyone. Permanent registration is granted only to those accorded refugee status, and 
they are allowed to reside only at the residence of their relatives. Asylum applicants are given 
temporary registration for one year. All other foreign citizens are entitled to register only for 45 days, 
once a year, which can be extended by another 45 days (Osipov 1998:144-50, International Helsinki 
Federation 2001:127). In some resort areas, registration must be authorized by a regional 
commission. On the other hand, persons without local registration are not allowed to purchase real 
estate (Osipov 1998:155). In some regions, including Moscow, there is a fee for the registration, and 
in some, asylum applicants of certain ethnic backgrounds are exempted from the fee while others are 
not (Khoperskaya 1998:130-38, Osipov 1988:153).  
Other Countries 
Until very recently, other Eastern European states had not developed concepts of migration policy, 
but, following the Western European example, treated immigration on an ad hoc basis, determined 
by short-term pressures of public opinion, “national” or ethnic solidarity, the economy, and lately 
accession to the European Union. On the other hand, the legislative framework on the status of 
foreign citizens is relatively more comprehensive and more consistently implemented than in Russia.  
In 2002, the Czech Republic published the principles of its immigration policy, which stresses 
cracking down on illegal migration but “supports immigration that is an asset for the state and 
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society” (Drbohlav 2003). Furthermore, in 2003, the Czech government launched a pilot project 
monitoring the integration of foreign workers from three countries who volunteered for the program 
and scored at least 25 points on a 66-point scale that takes into account age, occupation, education, 
and experience. After 30 months, qualifying participants will be recommended for permanent 
residence. This project is intended to be a pilot for an active immigration policy1. The Polish 
government began work on the concept of a migration policy in 2002 (Iglicka et al. 2003:396). Other 
countries have made no moves yet to develop a comprehensive migration policy. 
In most of the countries permanent residents enjoy the same access to work, welfare benefits, 
education, and health care as citizens do. But the legal security of permanent residents varies by 
country. In Hungary, permanent residence permits – despite being so called – must be renewed every 
five years and “a change in the conditions of residence” (for example if the holder’s taxed income falls 
below a certain level) can result in a revocation. This means that, for fear of their permanent residence 
permit being cancelled, many foreigners do not have access to most of the welfare benefits they are 
entitled to. Poland, on the other hand, permanent resident status can only be revoked for criminal 
convictions of over three years in prison, or for reasons of “national security” (Iglicka et al. 2003:425). 
Most Eastern European countries have ratified the 1951 Convention on refugees and other 
international legal instruments pertaining to the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. Recognized 
refugees in these countries enjoy similar rights to citizens. The rights of rejected asylum applicants 
who cannot be returned to their countries for humanitarian reasons (due to the principle of non-
refoulement) vary across countries, although they have much more limited rights to medical care, 
welfare, and employment than refugees do. They enjoy some access to financial aid in the Czech 
Republic, access to free education up to secondary level; to a simplified work permit approval 
procedure in Hungary; and to all of the above in Bulgaria; but there are no instruments to protect 
them in Estonia (Potisepp and Adamson 2001:176, Tychtl 2001:156-158, Marincheshka 2001:57). 
1.1.2 Legislation Defining Titular and Indigenous Ethnic Groups 
Laws of some Eastern European countries (Latvia, Slovakia) declare one particular ethnic group as the 
“nation-forming” one. Some countries (Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Estonia) have laws on 
the national language that limit the use of other languages. Personal identification documents issued 
for citizens of several post-Soviet countries, including Latvia, carry a mandatory identification of 
ethnicity, which is determined by the state based on the ethnicity of the parents, rather than by the 
individual him/herself.  
Some countries (Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia,) legally define “historical” ethnic minorities. Only 
the groups listed enjoy minority rights. In Hungary, the list can be expanded by approval of the 
President if a sufficient number of citizens declare themselves as belonging to an ethnic group which 
they can prove has been present in Hungary for at least one hundred years. The Council of Europe's 
commissioner for human rights noted in 2003 that Slovenia should do more for those minorities it 
did not consider "autochthonous" (RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 7, No. 91, Part II, 15 May 2003). 
States that only recently became independent faced a special legislative task: determining the 
criteria upon which citizenship of the new state was to be granted to residents. Most states accepted 
residence at time of independence as the dominant criterion, but Estonia and Latvia used residence at 
the time of annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 instead. This created large groups of residents, 
mostly ethnic Russians, to whom citizenship was denied. Laws adopted in the mid-1990s “practically 
legalized the connection of naturalization to ethnicity”. In 1994, one-third of the residents of Latvia 
and Estonia did not have local citizenship, which, apart from denying them the right to political 
 
1 See http://www.mpsv.cz/files/clanky/2983/english.pdf. 
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representation, also deprived them from economic opportunities, such as participating in land 
privatization (Tishkov 1996:106-107). 
Many countries, as well as some regions within the Russian Federation, discriminate between 
foreign citizens based on their “ethnic closeness” to their own titular population. (There are numerous 
Western European examples of such legislation as well.) A more extreme version of such 
discrimination is present in a number of regional laws in Russia, which establish a special status of 
“repatriates” for migrants belonging to the dominant ethnic group (not necessarily Russian). This 
status offers privileges in registration, ownership of real estate etc., regardless of the “repatriate”’s 
citizenship (Khoperskaia 1998:130-38).  
A less extreme version of such discrimination exists in legislation in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Croatia, and Hungary. Most of these laws provide positive discrimination 
of co-ethnics in the immigration and naturalization process as well as employment and other benefits. 
In Romania, Moldovans, who are considered to be ethnic Romanians, enjoy special rights in 
employment and education. The best-known and probably most comprehensive of such laws is 
Hungary’s so-called “status law” (Law LXII of 2001), which establishes “Hungarian National Identity 
Cards” for citizens of neighboring countries (except Austria) who are judged to be ethnic Hungarians 
and apply for them. Holders of such cards are entitled to apply for work permits in Hungary for three 
months each year under a simplified procedure, which means that Employment Offices need not 
certify the availability of qualified Hungarian citizens for the jobs they are applying for. (This clause 
caused objections by governments of neighboring countries, which stated that Hungary cannot 
discriminate between the citizens of another country based on their ethnicity. As a result, Hungary 
extended the same provision to all Romanian citizens in a separate treaty, but not to citizens of other 
countries.) In addition, holders of the card enjoy access to scholarships and discounted travel, and the 
government tabling the bill foresaw that they would enjoy positive discrimination if a visa 
requirement is imposed on them after Hungary’s entry into the EU (Népszabadság, 15 June 2001). 
Apart from this law, there are some 150 legal texts that explicitly or implicitly contain the possibility 
of positive discrimination of ethnic Hungarians over other foreigners in entry, employment, 
residence, and naturalisation (Tóth 2001).  
Finally, the Stavropol and Krasnodar Regions in Russia, have unconstitutional legislation that 
discriminate between local residents and all others, regardless of citizenship, in the right to residence 
and ownership of real estate (Mukomel 2000:272, Osipov 1998:155). 
1.1.3 Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
The constitutions of a number of Eastern European countries (including those that define “titular” 
ethnic groups, such as Latvia and Estonia) contain clauses prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity. Some countries have anti-discrimination clauses contained in other laws. In Hungary, the 
ban on discrimination is repeated in the laws on education and the Labor Code: the latter puts the 
burden of proof on the employer accused of discrimination. Slovenian law appears to have the 
strictest provisions in this respect. In addition to enshrining the ban on discrimination in the 
Constitution, it makes “infringing on equality” – meaning denying someone basic rights or freedoms 
guaranteed by law on the basis of nationality, race, or religion – as well as harassing an individual or 
organization because it supports the equality of people crimes punishable by up to one year in prison, 
or three years if the perpetrator is an official (Article 141 of the Penal Code; Školkay 2002). By 
contrast, in Hungary and Bulgaria, there is no legal recourse against violations of non-discrimination 
provisions (Tóth 2002, Ilieva 2003). 
Most Eastern European states have ratified the major international instruments of human rights 
protection, such as the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Protocol 12 of the European 
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Convention on Human Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. For example, 
Hungary has a decree prohibiting discrimination in public education. Russia’s Federal Migration 
Program contains the principle of non-discrimination of migrants based on race, creed, citizenship, 
belonging to a particular social group, or political convictions (Voronina 1998:47). Romania 
sanctions discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language, origin, social origin, ethnic identity, or 
nationality in commercial advertising (Iordache and Tabacu 2003). 
A related body of legislation is that penalizing “hate crime” and “hate speech”. In Slovenia, 
“incitement to national, racial, religious, or other inequality” and “encouragement of national, racial, 
religious, or other hatred and intolerance” are prohibited by the Constitution (Article 36). In 
addition, the Mass Media Act prohibits programming that encourages national, racial, religious, 
gender or any other inequality (Article 8) or incites discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, or 
ethnicity (Article 47) and establishes fines of up to the equivalent of $10,000 for publishers and 
individuals who violate these articles (Article 129; Školkay 2002). The Slovak penal code prohibits 
“defamation of a nation, race, or groups of people based on their political ideology, religion, or 
atheism” (Article 198). Encouragement of national or racial hatred is punishable by a year in prison or 
a fine (Article 198a). Supporting movements that promote “national, racial, religious, or class hatred” 
can be punished by one to eight years in prison (Article 260; Školkay 2002). Article 317 of the 
Romanian Criminal Code prohibits "incitement to racial or national hatred” and punishes it with up 
to 5 years imprisonment, while Emergency Ordinance 31/2002 criminalizes "the dissemination, 
selling or manufacturing of fascist, racist, or xenophobic symbols" (Iordache and Tabacu 2003). 
Similarly, in Hungary, “violence or incitement against an national or religious group” is a crime. 
However, in all of these countries, these clauses are interpreted in a very restrictive fashion, and very 
few convictions have been made on their base. No one in any of these countries has yet been accused 
of “incitement” against a migrant group. The same is true for Latvia, where the law prohibits 
“incitement or propagation of hate speech” but requires “the demonstration of an intent to promote 
national or racial hatred” (Open Society Institute 2002:339).  
Russia has one of the broadest legal definitions of hate speech. The Constitution as well as Article 
282 of the criminal code prohibits “incit[ement] of ethnic, racial, or religious hostility, humiliation of 
ethnic dignity, as well as the promotion of the ideas of exclusiveness, superiority or inferiority 
resulting from religious, ethnic or racial affiliation”. If such offences are committed publicly or 
through the mass media they carry a punishment of up to four years in prison (Lokshina 2002:99). 
Article 63 makes the motive of ethnic, racial, or religious hostility an aggravating circumstance of a 
crime. Here too, however, the articles are rarely used in practice (Lokshina 2002:102), although in the 
summer of 2003, a case was being prosecuted against several newspapers for accused of calling to exile 
or exterminate Jews and insulting “Christians and peoples from Asia and the Caucasus” (RFE/RL 
Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 93, Part I, 19 May 2003). 
1.1.4 Summary 
With relatively minor differences, Hungary shares with other Central Eastern European states (1) a 
lack of comprehensive immigration legislation (although a few states are moving toward creating it); 
(2) lack of coordination between migration regulations and labor, civil, investment legislation; and (3) 
sweeping discretionary rights granted to authorities in processing applications for visas and residence 
permits. These conditions constitute the legal basis of xenophobia. In Russia, the situation is different: 
while there is legal acceptance of migration in general, it does not function in practice since local laws 
that actually govern access of migrants to residence, housing, and other entitlements are inconsistent 
with it and in part unconstitutional and openly discriminative. 
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While legal provisions for refugees and asylum seekers are broadly in line with those in other 
countries in the region (though asylum seekers can be detained longer), the status of permanent 
residents is subject to a legal insecurity not found in other countries. 
More strongly than other countries in the region, Hungary discriminates between foreigners of 
Hungarian ethnicity and all others. 
As elsewhere in the region, anti-discrimination legislation in Hungary exists, and more is in 
preparation, but it has not been applied to migrants.  
1.2 Administrative Practices 
The practices of institutions and individual officials are determined not only by how they apply legal 
and procedural regulations (or their violation) but also by the internal culture of the institutions. 
Although such institutional cultures are in turn influenced by dominant political and societal 
discourses, they can be highly idiosyncratic and resistant to the environment, including the legal 
environment. The more procedural discretion legal regulations allow institutions, the more their 
cultures influence the level of exclusion foreigners encounter.  
1.2.1 Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Applicants 
In Russia, asylum applicants must present a registration from the local Visa and Registrations 
Department (UVIR), which in turn usually refuses to register them in absence of a legal claim to stay 
and accommodation. Therefore many more asylum seekers register with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees than with Russian migration authorities, which they do not trust (Forced 
Migration Monitor 1996a). Even those asylum applicants who have managed to register with the 
Russian authorities are usually denied residential registration, which prevents them from renting 
accommodation outside of the refugee accommodation centers. Refugees without residential 
registration have no access to education, legal employment, and social security, regardless of legal 
provisions to the contrary governing refugee status (International Helsinki Federation 2001:445). 
Moreover, registered asylum applicants, and even recognized refugees, are subject to harassment, fines, 
detention, and threats of deportation by the police. Police claim that their documents are not valid 
and frequently use threats to extort money and “confiscate” merchandize; they often use violence, 
destroy the documents, or arrest refugees for several days. In the Krasnodar Region, refugees can be 
denied registration on the basis that they do not have sufficient living space, arbitrarily defined by the 
local branch of the migration authority. This is sometimes used to ferret out “ethnically alien” 
migrants such as Turks and Armenians. The lengthy process of obtaining registration prevents asylum 
applicants and refugees from working, although they would be legally entitled to do so. Russian 
authorities admit that they are unable to satisfy their Convention obligations in providing for refugees 
because of a lack of funding (Yastrebova 1998: 94-95, 101, Osipov 1998:148, 152). So-called 
Meskheti Turks, who had been deported from Georgia to Uzbekistan by Stalin and then fled 
Uzbekistan for the Krasnodar Region in the early 1990s, are denied marriage registration, welfare 
benefits, and education; and regional authorities, in alliance with Cossacks, have successfully pressed 
them to emigrate to Turkey (International Helsinki Federation 2001:128). Refugees from the 
Caucasus countries face discrimination in receiving accommodation in Moscow (Forced Migration 
Monitor 1997a).  
While the condition of recognized refugees is more favorable in Central Eastern Europe than in 
Russia, the protection of asylum seekers varies across the countries. In Estonia, the review of asylum 
applications is made by a body subordinated to the Ministry of Interior rather than by an 
independent body (Potisepp and Adamson 2001:166-69, 175). In Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria, 
?  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S  
14 
asylum applicants can be deported before the application procedure ends if authorities decide that 
they come from “manifestly” safe country of origin or transit. Immigration officials sometimes simply 
tell migrants not to bother applying for asylum (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2002, Izing 2003, 
Kaczmarczyk 2001:216, 225, Marincheshka 2001:53). In Poland, rulings on applications from some 
countries are made in one day (Kaczmarczyk 2001:218). 
In Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia, an arbitrarily selected minority of asylum seekers without a 
legal title is detained in closed reception centers. In Hungary, such detention can last up to 12 
months, and there have been reports of brutal and degrading treatment (Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee 2002a,b). In Poland, detention is limited to 30 days.  
Asylum applicants have the right to work in some countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic) but 
not in others (Hungary). Refugees are entitled to most benefits citizens enjoy, but in most countries, 
their access to employment is hindered by the lack of an effective integration program. For that 
reason, most refugees in Hungary are unable to pay for accommodation of their own and, after their 
release from refugee camps, become homeless if they cannot find accommodation with acquaintances 
(Menedék 2003). 
1.2.2 Treatment of Legal Foreign Residents 
In most Eastern European countries, foreigners who are not refugees and – where there is such 
legislation – not members of the dominant local ethnic group are seen as simply a policing issue. 
Although the Czech Republic developed a concept of immigrant integration in 2002, Poland began 
working on such a concept in the same year, and Hungary in the following year, in practice migrants 
continue to fall in the gap between the system charged with the protection of the rights and cultures 
of “indigenous” ethnic minorities and the integration provisions of the refugee protection system, 
with no state bureaucracy concerned with them. Responding to a foreign researcher’s question on 
whether Hungary has a policy of integration of legal immigrants, the head of Hungary’s Office of 
Immigration and Nationality’s Residence Department – the top official in charge of non-permanent 
residents – said, “When someone has found a job, that’s integration.”  
In Russia, Hungary, Romania, and the Czech Republic, there have been reports of police 
harassment of foreigners, particularly those with visibly different physical traits (International 
Helsinki Federation 2001:432, Forschungsgemeinschaft 2001). This includes checks by police, border 
guard, customs, tax and employment office agents and public land superintendents in public places, 
often accompanied by bribe-taking. Some researchers claim that Czech police are particularly keen to 
keep tourist areas “clean” of Eastern European migrants (Forschungsgemeinschaft 2001). According 
to the Czech Helsinki Committee, “the way the Aliens Police … functions is still similar to … before 
… 1989” (Czech Helsinki Committee 2001:33). In Hungary in particular, harassment by customs 
and tax officers has elicited complaints from large Western-invested companies and, in 2003, a 
Bavarian government minister, who warned that Hungary risked losing investment (Népszabadság, 3 
June, p. 1). 
In Hungary, Border Guard and immigration officials (Article 61 of 2001 Alien Policing Law) are 
entitled to enter homes of foreigners to check their documents. Foreigners are particularly often 
subjected to police brutality, a point noted in the European Commission’s 2001 Regular Report on 
Hungary (SEC(2001) 1748), as well as to extortion by police. Solicitors and foreigners complain that 
the procedure of applying for temporary and permanent residence permits at the Office of 
Immigration and Nationality (OIN) is arbitrary, lengthy, and humiliating. A solicitor who served as 
Head of the Administration Division of the national police (in charge of immigration matters) until 
1996 says that “foreigners and their attorneys are humiliated in every single case. … The Interior 
Ministry continues to behave like a state within a state, painting an enemy image of the foreigners, 
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regardless of their color”.2 A former Head of the Immigration Department of the police who has been 
practicing as an immigration solicitor since 1997 described the conditions as “violating human 
dignity”.3 The Parliamentary Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights stated that the OIN’s non-
compliance with procedural deadlines was unconstitutional.4  
Some countries practice extralegal discrimination by citizenship. In Hungary, solicitors report that 
residence permit applications by ethnic Hungarians or citizens of a Western country are more 
frequently approved than those by others who report the same income or proof of accommodation.5 
Permanent residence permit applications by citizens of certain countries including China and 
Vietnam are screened for the authenticity of applicants’ visas. Several countries maintain “blacklists” 
that discriminate citizens of certain countries for immigration purposes. These “blacklists” are not 
publicly released nor regulated by law. In the Czech Republic, some nationalities, including Chinese, 
are classified as “problem nationalities” in terms of immigration risk; issuance of residence permits to 
them is stricter (Forschungsgemeinschaft 2001:42; Moore and Tubilewicz 2001).6  
Such discrimination encourages corruption. Chinese informants in Hungary maintain that 
between 2000 and 2002, persons with private passports have been unable to obtain Hungarian visas 
of any title without paying a middleman claiming to have access to the Interior Ministry. Middle-
ranking Interior Ministry officials in charge of approving visas and permanent residence permits have 
been arrested on corruption charges. 
In the welfare and education system, migrants are often marginalized. Even though permanent 
residents in most countries are entitled to the same access to these systems as citizens, the systems are 
not equipped to deal with individuals who do not speak the local language. Overworked and 
underfinanced Hungarian hospitals and schools sometimes simply try to drive migrants away. Many 
schools simply certify the attendance of those children whose knowledge of Hungarian is insufficient, 
and do not try to educate, let alone evaluate them. Often, such pupils are placed in classes with 
younger children. This inevitably results in poor performance and dropping out. Some local 
governments have ordered schools to implement illegal fees for foreign children. 
The treatment of “racially motivated” crimes differs rather significantly between the countries. In 
Russia, according to Human Rights Watch (2003), police generally “deny racial motivation unless 
presented with strong supporting evidence such as video footage of the crime”. In some cases, police 
refuse to arrest skinheads attacking African students, and students do not report assaults to the police 
for fear of further repercussions (International Helsinki Federation 2001:420). The situation is similar 
in Hungary: very few court cases have been heard where ethnicity was claimed to be a motive, and 
even these have mostly been rejected. Thus, a group of villagers who vandalized a home purchased by 
a Gypsy family, openly stating that it was to prevent them from moving in, were acquitted of 
ethnically motivated violence in 2003 (Heti Világgazdaság, 31 May, 15). In Slovakia, 40 authorities 
registered 109 such cases in 2002, up from 40 in 2001 (RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 7, No. 75, Part II, 18 
April 2003), probably reflecting greater police attention to crimes that were formerly treated with 
indifference. The Czech government seems to pay the most attention to them: it adopted measures 
against “racially motivated” crime in 1995, and currently there are 140 police specializing in such 
crimes, versus ten in Slovakia (Školkay 2002). 
 
2  Interview with Julianna Czégény, Budapest, 4 November 2002. 
3  Interview with Katalin Baranyi Judák, Budapest, 29 October 2002. 
4  Report 4859/2000 by General Deputy Commissioner Takács ALbert, 15 April 2003. 
5  Interviews with Julianna Czégény (see above) and Károly Nagy, Budapest, 6 November 2002. 
6  Intervew with Károly Nagy. 
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Russian speakers in Estonia and Latvia who have resided there since before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union but have not acquired local citizenship constitute a special case. 40% of non-ethnic 
Estonians in Estonia believe that they are discriminated against in acquiring residence permits and 
citizenship, and 46% think that they experience unequal treatment by officials because of their 
insufficient fluency in Estonian. For the same reason, they may be disadvantaged in employment, and 
they are overrepresented in the prison population and less likely to be paroled than ethnic Estonians. 
Russian speakers in Latvia, where the government’s Integration Program has acknowledges obstacles 
in applying for citizenship, experience similar problems; 22% of the Latvian population are not 
Latvian citizens (Open Society Institute 2002:334-5, 347). The main reason for low naturalization 
rates is the requirement of fluency in the national language. The debate on the treatment of Russian 
speakers in Estonia and Latvia centers on their ability to naturalize and the protection of their civil, 
social, and cultural rights once naturalized, while the treatment of those who remain foreign citizens is 
not seen as a separate problem (Open Society Institute 2002:213-43, 300-4, 322ff). 
1.3 Political and Public Discourses 
1.3.1 Politics 
Discursive tropes rehearsed by many powerful mainstream institutional and political players across 
Eastern Europe directly or indirectly contribute to xenophobia. Unlike in Western Europe, they are 
not limited to the so-called right wing. But the degree to which xenophobic discourses dominate, 
again, shows considerable variation among the countries. 
With the partial exception of Russia, both sides in the public debate on national homogeneity 
versus diversity and on the treatment of minorities focus on “indigenous” groups rather than 
migrants. In other words, the frontline between nationalists and liberals in this question is defined by 
attitudes to Roma, Jews, and local ethnic minorities such as Hungarians, Russians, or “people from 
the Caucasus” rather than to immigration from abroad. The latter do receive an occasional swipe 
from the nationalists, in the familiar contexts of lamenting low local fertility, alleged loss of jobs to 
migrants, or purchase of enterprises, land, and real estate by them (generally “Westerners”), but hate 
speech is rarely directed at them. Latvia and Estonia, which are reluctant to naturalize ethnic Russians, 
are in a special situation since Russians continue to be non-citizens although they are not recent 
migrants. 
Few groups have a programmatic focus on opposing immigration. Most of those that do are in 
Russia. The mayor of Moscow, who claims that the authorities must defend the territory in their 
charge against a “wave” of illegal immigration (Ivanova 1998:93) and who has ordered several 
deportations of unauthorized migrants since 1993 (e.g. Humphrey 2002:50, TOL 2002). Cossack 
groups in Southwestern Russia oppose immigration from the Caucasus (both from inside and outside 
the Russian border; Khoperskaya 1998:125, International Helsinki Federation 2001:127-128, 152). 
A number of local politicians and Cossack leaders in the Russian Far East who oppose immigration 
from China and the Caucasus (e.g. Dyatlov 1999a:91-93, Pushkarev 1999), and Vladimir 
Zhirinovskii’s Liberal Demoratic Party of Russia that opposes both and periodically calls for their 
deportation (Dyatlov 1999b:128). Vigilante militias and armed groups have attacked migrants from 
the Caucasus in both regions (Forced Migration Monitor 1996b, Dyatlov 1999b:128, Lokshina 
2002:98). In some places, Cossack units have been financed by local authorities or allowed to conduct 
document checks and raids (Ossipov 1998:156, Lokshina 2002:98) with the result of driving 
Caucasus traders from the markets with the connivance of local officials (Malashenko 1999:14). A 
member of the Russian Duma ran for governor of Irkutsk in 1997 on a ticket of stopping “Chinese 
expansion” and “creating unbearable conditions for foreigners”, making anti-immigrant sentiment a 
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major campaign issue; in the previous year, several politicians who had campaigned for “stricter 
measures against the criminal activity of Caucasians and foreigners” had been elected to the City 
Duma (Dyatlov 1999a:93, 1999b:129-30).  
At the same time, the free-market discourse of migration as a normal, potentially plannable and 
beneficial phenomenon is present in Russia and engaged in by mainstream academic and liberal 
political circles.  
Explicit anti-immigrant politics have much less currency in Central Eastern Europe. Its examples 
at the national level include the extra-parliamentary Republican Party in the Czech Republic. At the 
level of local, temporary mobilization, the 2002 municipal elections in the Hungarian city of 
Békéscsaba, where a candidate from Fidesz, the largest opposition party, campaigned on the ticket of 
opposing the opening of a home for unaccompanied refugee children. In October 2001, the Liberal 
mayor of another Hungarian town, Kalocsa, led several thousand locals in a protest against the 
opening of a refugee camp there. In November 2000, the mayor of Ljubljana, Slovenia, protested 
against the presence of a “Home for the Removal of Foreigners” (Školkay 2002).  
While few political forces outside Russia have made anti-immigration politics a centerpiece of 
their activity, official and public debates on immigration across the political spectrum have largely 
focused on control, security and restriction. Nonetheless, the debate has shown signs of evolving 
differently in different Central Eastern European countries, with alternative discourses growing 
stronger in some.  In the following section, I will consider first-wave EU accession countries, mainly 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. 
Around 1992, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, politicians and the 
media in these countries ushered in a migrantophobic discourse, influenced by Western European 
fears and augmented by local discontent over economic problems. In Hungary, the Minister of the 
Interior called for the “stopping of the flood of refugees” (Népszabadság, 4 February 1992). As the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee wrote in a 2001 communication:  
The policy of the Hungarian government and the asylum and aliens policing issue 
probably played an important role in the evolution of an anti-foreigner and anti-
refugee atmosphere. …  The attitude of the government was reflected in the 1993 
Aliens Act, which allowed the authorities to hold foreigners staying in Hungary 
without legal grounds in detention for a longer time. 
 
During that period, Polish “experts … pointed to … public security threats and called for a state 
response”, while 80% of Poles “expected a large influx of asylum seekers” (Iglicka et al. 2003:391). In 
the following years, the few parliamentary discussions on migration in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary focused on asylum, “illegal” migration, border control – these three issues usually linked 
– and visa policy (Tychtl 2001:152). In Hungary, there was an additional focus on ethnic Hungarians 
from abroad, but symbolic nationalistic concern rather than actual issues of migration defined the 
terms of the debate (Melegh 2002).  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, even as immigration laws became successively more restrictive 
across Eastern Europe, the monolithic nature of the control-and-restriction discourse began to loosen 
up in Poland. In the debate of the Act on Aliens between 1995 and 1997, while some members of the 
Polish parliament focused on “illegal” immigration and suggested that it had an effect on 
unemployment, others proposed preferential clauses for potential investors. The debate expanded to 
many non-governmental actors, with the effect of shifting it “from a defensive and restrictive attitude 
towards a humanitarian approach … more acceptable to Polish society” (Iglicka et al. 2003:393-394). 
Beginning in 1996, the Ombudsman issued several recommendations broadly in favor of the rights of 
immigrants, including the legalization of illegal immigrants (Iglicka et al. 2003:405). In 2001, there 
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was vocal opposition to restrictions introduced to the act citing EU accession requirements, which 
argued that Poland had a “moral duty to support … democracy in the East,” and open borders were 
“an indispensable instrument of this support”. The two largest opposition parties demanded the 
development of a comprehensive migration policy, which began in 2002 “increasingly in view of the 
benefits which the foreigners could bring to the market” (Iglicka et al. 2003:395-397). In 2003, the 
president of the Polish Confederation of Private Employers came out in favor of labor immigration.7  
In the Czech Republic, an alternative discourse on migration emerged more slowly, and not so 
much in public debate as in the executive. A Committee for Immigrant Integration was established in 
1999; the government began the development of the Pilot Project for the Selection of Qualified 
Foreign Workers began in 2001; and the principles of an immigration policy that “supports 
immigration that is an asset for the state and society” were adopted in 2002 (Drbohlav 2003:78-79, 
82). The fact that the pilot project is led by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs rather than by 
the Ministry of the Interior suggests that the government wishes to shift control of the migration 
discourse away from control-and-restriction-oriented government bodies towards those focused on 
social integration. In 2000, the government ran a “Tolerance Campaign” “to promote inter-ethnic 
understanding and highlight problems minorities and immigrants are facing” (Tychtl 2001:145). 
This has not yet resulted in a broader discussion of the issue by political parties or civil organizations 
(Drbohlav 2003:84).  
In Estonia, the “Lots of Great People” and “Friendship Starts with a Smile” campaigns in 1999 
and 2000 essentially focused on Russian speakers (Open Society Institute 2002:215). The Slovak 
government established a Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia in 2001, supported anti-
racist tolerance campaigns in print, electronic and outdoors media in 2001-02, and (following earlier 
initiatives) launched a new Action Plan against Racism in 2002. In Slovenia, there is no comparable 
official attention to the issue, but the pro-migration discourse has been successfully thematized by a 
number of NGOs, which organized an unauthorized demonstration against xenophobia and 
intolerance in the same year (Školkay 2002). 
Meanwhile, in Hungary, migration continued to be discussed, if at all, in exclusively negative 
terms. The Asylum Act’s 1999 amendments were implemented within the framework of a legislative 
package against organized crime. In a 2001 parliamentary debate, Socialists opposing a treaty allowing 
Romanian citizens easier access to seasonal labor, talked about “unleashing millions of Romanian 
workers” onto the labor market, while nationalists who supported the treaty argued that it was 
necessary for the protection of ethnic Hungarians abroad (Melegh 2002). In 2002, the research 
director of the Institute for Security and Defense Studies called illegal mass migration a potential 
“civilizational catastrophe” leading to illegal labor, crime, terrorism, and the “appearance of foreign 
agents”. At the same event, the State Secretary of the Interior called it regrettable that “Hungary 
lacked tolerance of foreigners,” which prevented the government from settling refugees in 
depopulated villages (Népszabadság, 21 May 2001). An opposition Socialist Member of Parliament 
agreed that “in spirit, Hungary is not an accepting country” (Oltalomkeresők, October 2001, 6). The 
only national survey on the distribution of foreign residents was commissioned (in 1995 and again in 
1997) by the Coordinating Committee for Economic Security together with the Strategic Working 
Group on European Integration. Local mayors to whom the survey was administered evaluated the 
presence of foreigners negatively (Sik 1998:13). Neither the Ombudsman – though issuing several 
recommendations regarding the rights of detained “illegal” migrants – nor human rights or refugee 
 
7  Jeremi Mordasewicz at “National and European Immigration Policy after the EU Enlargement,” 4th CASE European 
Seminar, Warsaw, 16 May 2003.  
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organizations have initiated a broader advocacy of immigration, focusing instead on the rights and 
living conditions of refugees. 
1.3.2 Media 
In large part as a consequence of the above, media discourses on foreigners are usually dominated by 
negative and stereotypical portrayals. Still, in a number of countries, including Russia, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, an alternative, tolerant portrayal is more present than in 
others.  
In Hungary, statements of a degrading nature are often encountered even in media considered 
liberal or left-wing. An analysis of five national and four regional Hungarian dailies in 1997 showed 
that while tourists and investors are generally portrayed in a positive and “human” light, refugees and 
migrants are presented as “faceless masses” of “intruders,” focusing on illegal migration and labor as 
well as crime (Nyilvánosság Klub 1999). Similarly, a 1996 analysis of media reporting on the Chinese 
by Tóth concluded that the press has no sense of responsibility for applying pejorative adjectives, 
reporting unverified statements, or portraying the author’s prejudices as common knowledge. On 5 
May 1997, the largest daily, Népszabadság, identified with the left wing, claimed that “several Chinese 
shops and restaurants were probably established by the triads” (Chinese criminal groups operating in 
Hong Kong). In August 2001, a series of newspaper articles appeared claiming that the corpses of 
dead Chinese mysteriously disappear so that their documents can be re-used. Both occasions drew 
strong protests from Chinese organizations (e.g. Budapeisi Zhoubao, 24-31 August, 1). In 2003, the 
Japanese Embassy and the Association of Japanese in Hungary protested against the airing of a series 
entitled “Mitsuko: The world through slanted eyes” of the second-largest Hungarian television 
channel, tv2, in which tv2’s anchorwoman dressed up as a “typical” Japanese woman, asked stupid 
questions and giggled. Anti-migration opinions come not only from the right but also from the left: a 
high-profile left-wing professor of philosophy, Almási Miklós, wrote in Népszabadság that “a greater 
part of (immigrants) is life-threatening: a political time bomb, a burden on society” (10 May 2003).  
An analysis of the press in Irkutsk, a Siberian city, yielded very similar results to Tóth’s, showing 
that, across the political spectrum of the papers, most of their reporting on Chinese and Caucasus 
migrants focused on criminality, illegal migration, smuggling, and the low quality of the goods they 
sold (Dyatlov 1999a:90, 1999b:119-20). More broadly, just as media in Central Eastern Europe 
accuse the “Russian mafia” of controlling crime, buying up real estate and corporations, the same 
unfounded allegations are made in Russian media against migrants from the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, to the extent that a politician’s “contacts” with them can bring accusations of corruption 
(Dyatlov 1999b:120, 131). While an accused criminal’s ethnicity is always mentioned if he is “from 
the Caucasus,” this is rarely done in any other case (Voronin 1996, Sikevich 1999:106), a fact 
condemned by President Yeltsin’s advisory body, the Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes, in 
1994 (Dyatlov 1999b:120). Palyutina (1996:345) squarely blames the “mythologization” of the 
image of migrants from the Caucasus in Irkutsk on “brainwashing”. From the fact that although very 
few locals have actually met such migrants, their opinion on them is very similar to the results of 
surveys in Astrakhan’, where there are many of them, she concludes that media and officials have 
created a standardized negative discourse on these migrants across Russia. “The authorities … seeing 
in (migrants) only a criminal aspect and not wishing yet to find constructive ways of solutions (to 
problems) … contributes to the conservation and potential growth of interethnic tensions.” 
An analysis of the reporting on Vietnamese migrants in Polish dailies across the political spectrum 
in 1993 and 2001 again echoed Tóth’s conclusions regarding a focus on “illegal” migration, crime, 
and economic and sanitary threat (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2002). Similarly, an analysis of the main 
Slovene newspaper concludes that reporting on a conflict between a centre housing “illegal 
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immigrants” and local residents was “open primarily for … intolerant and xenophobic statements” 
while “immigrants remained an indistinct mass … without a voice” and a “threat” (Kuhar 2001:46). 
Kuhar also notes the criminalization of foreigners as well as the use of emotive language such as the 
terms “seize” and “expel” instead of more neutral ones (Kuhar 2001:46-47). In Czech media, too, 
migrants from Eastern Europe are frequently criminalized (Forschungsgemeinschaft 2001:45).  
Nonetheless, in Slovakia and Slovenia, researchers have noted trends toward more a balanced 
portrayal of foreigners in the media (Jalušič 2001:15). Školkay (2002) links this to a general turn 
toward greater thematization of civil rights in 2001. In Poland, the picture appears to be more 
differentiated. Although the most frequently reported migration topic has been the criminal or illegal 
behavior of migrants from the former Soviet Union (the so-called “Russian Mafia”), the portrayal of 
asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia has been generally sympathetic, and labor migration has 
been presented as attesting to Poland’s development. Raids on undocumented Roma migrants 
provoked criticism in the media and the Sejm (parliament) (Stola 2001:192-3). 
1.4 The Impact of EU Accession Negotiations 
1.4.1 Non-Discrimination 
Issues of minority rights and xenophobia remain, to a substantial degree, foreign policy issues. 
Accession criteria to the European Union are probably the most powerful incentive for post-state 
socialist European countries to enforce respect for minority rights; but they provide no clear 
guidelines for the evaluation of meeting these criteria. Moreover, the EU has no legally binding 
instruments to ensure that candidate states meet them. Nonetheless, the European Commission has 
repeatedly urged Estonia to accelerate the naturalization and integration of “Russian-speaking non-
citizens” (Potisepp and Adamson 2001:177-78). 
The European Council’s Race Equality Directive (2000/43) requires adopting anti-discrimination 
legislation going beyond general principles (the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination also recommends this). Romania was the first to adopt such a measure, Ordinance 
137 on the Prevention and Punishment of All Forms of Discrimination, in 2000, followed by Law 
48/2002 on Prevention and Punishment of All Forms of Discrimination (Iordache and Tabacu 
2003). Romania was followed by Bulgaria, and more states have such laws in the pipeline. The debate 
on these initiatives does not, however, extend to migrants, with the exception of the Russian-speaking 
population of the Baltic states. 
Ratification of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities has been 
made a mandatory precondition for admission of new member states. But again, each state is free to 
decide whether a minority group should be classified as “indigenous” and thus falling under the 
provisions of the Convention.  
Although the European Council has published a Directive defining minimum standards for the 
treatment of asylum seekers (2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003) and Communications on the rights of 
long-term foreign residents (COM(2001)127), in particular the right to family reunification 
(COM(2002)225), and other standards for the treatment of migrants, these standards have not 
figured in accession negotiations, suggesting that, unlike the treatment of minorities, the EU does not 
consider the treatment of migrants an important issue for accession countries. 
1.4.2 Immigration 
It is a widely shared perception in the “accession countries” that, as transit countries of migration to 
the EU, they are “under strong pressure to … implement a stricter immigration policy” (Tychtl 
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2001:158), and this pressure is the central if not only subject of accession-related negotiations on the 
subject of migration policy (as opposed to asylum). “EU expectations are especially clear in that 
further developments concerning migration should contribute to the blocking of the illegal transit of 
foreigners” (Aszalós 2001:193). Much of this pressure from member states’ internal affairs 
establishments is real. At its first meeting, the so-called Budapest Group, a permanent conference of 
EU members and accession countries since 1998, adopted a series of resolutions, including 
intensifying border controls, introducing sanctions on carriers (i.e. companies that operate 
transportation used by irregular migrants), and applying more restrictive visa regimes. The latter 
means discontinuing visa waiver regimes with countries that do not have such regimes with the EU 
and imposing stricter requirements on applicants from what EU home affairs bodies consider “risk 
countries” (Tychtl 2001:159). These measures go beyond the common legal framework of the EU 
and are sometimes more restrictive than member states’ own practices. The European Commission, in 
its yearly reports, has regularly urged applicants to improve border control, align visa policies with 
those of the EU, and fight against “trafficking in human beings,” and has transferred considerable 
funds to them for border-reinforcement projects (Potisepp and Adamson 2001:178-79, Aszalós 
2001:200-02, Kaczmarczyk 2001:227-28). 
As a result, countries preparing for accession to the EU have introduced increasingly restrictive 
immigration legislation and policies beginning in the mid-1990s, with a tangible effect on legal 
border crossings. In Hungary, the Director-General of the Office for Immigration and Naturalization 
declared that the “basic criterion in adopting” the law was “harmonizing the means of the fight 
against illegal immigration and illegal employment” with EU norms, and that “in accordance with 
expectations toward accession countries,” the law aimed at “more consistent action against foreigners 
who illegally enter and remain” in the country or “abuse the right to asylum”.8 The ratio of rejections 
of visa applications rose. The number of Hungarian visas issued dropped from 270,000 in 1996 to 
150,000 in 1999 (Aszalós 2001:190). Visa applications by citizens of certain countries, defined 
annually in a classified list, has been subjected to a check by the Interior Ministry, resulting in 
procedures lasting several months. The delivery of visas at the border was practically discontinued, 
plummeting from 431,000 in 1990 to 140,000 in 1999 (Aszalós 2001:190), although this is partly 
due to the fact that in 1990, citizens of many Western countries were still required visas. Except for 
ethnic Hungarians and family members of Hungarian citizens, applying for permanent residence has 
also become increasingly difficult.  
The Czech Republic replaced more liberal immigration and asylum regulations – called “a model 
for Europe” by the lobby group Forschungsgemeinschaft Flucht und Migration (2001) – with a 
stricter law in 2000 and introduced the visa requirement for citizens of 18 countries. The Czech 
Helsinki Committee (2001:31) commented that the law “drew inspiration prevailingly from the 
restrictive elements of the European legislation, while disregarding the overall humanistic spirit of the 
European law … which counterbalance(s) the restrictive elements”. Police were given the new task to 
check the documents of foreigners in public places and detain unauthorized migrants. Refugee 
recognition rates had dropped from 39% in 1991 to 1.9% in 1998 (Drbohlav 2001: 218). Poland 
adopted a more restrictive Aliens Act in 1997 and introduced new visa regulations in 1998 that 
dramatically reduced visits from Russia and Belarus, provoking sharp reactions and retaliatory 
measures from Moscow and Minsk (Stola 2001:197). 
Although Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled to join the EU no earlier than 2007, they have 
been implementing similar restrictions. Their inclusion on a list of countries whose nationals must 
obtain visas for Schengen member states was perceived as a national humiliation, and Bulgaria’s 
 
8  Letter to Ferenc Kőszeg, President, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2 September 2002 (doc. no. 106-T-5371/9/02). 
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Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in 1998 that “modifications of the legislation designed 
to curb the immigration pressure towards Western Europe” were “instrumental” (Bulgaria 1998:4). 
One of these measures was imposing “extremely severe requirements” on visa applicants from these 
countries, as a result of which the number of visitors from these countries decreased by up to 90% 
(Bulgaria 1998:32), including a “total discontinuation” of the “highly profitable traditional tourist 
flow from the Middle East” (Bulgaria 1998:10) and the reduction of the number of visas issued to 
Chinese citizens to 200 per year (Bulgaria 1998:11). After the introduction of the visa requirement 
for Russian citizens, Russian tour operators registered a 30 to 40% drop in Russian tourism to 
Bulgaria in the summer of 20029. The Bulgarian President said that Bulgaria should abandon the visa 
regime with Russia during the tourist season10, but this was not carried out.  
The impact of the need to adapt to EU legislation on asylum laws have been more ambiguous. 
The yearly reports of the European Commission have pressed accession countries to improve asylum 
procedures but have been more vague than in the case of border enforcement and visas; the 1998 
report on Hungary called merely for an asylum policy “with sufficient resources” (Aszalós 2001:200). 
Still, in some cases (such as regarding the conditions of the detention of asylum seekers in the 1999 
Hungary report) the Commission offered specific criticism (Aszalós 2001:200). This worked: some 
countries, such as Estonia, created legal frameworks for treating asylum applications (Potisepp and 
Adamson 2001:164), or, in Hungary’s case, lifted a geographic restriction in accepting them and 
limited detention of asylum seekers (Aszalós 2001:186) following criticism from the Commission 
(Aszalós 2001:201). The EU has also provided funds for trainings and legal cooperation intended to 
enhance refugee protection (Potisepp and Adamson 2001:179). Later, however, some countries also 
justified restricting the rights of asylum seekers by the need to adapt to EU law. This was the case 
with the 2001 Hungarian law on refugees. Critics (Nagy 2001, Business Hungary 2001) argued that, 
first, Hungary was under no obligation, and had not been publicly requested, to harmonize its refugee 
legislation at this time. Second, EU standards of refugee protection were changing and continue to do 
so, and when and if Hungary is admitted to the Union, they will be substantially different from those 
on which new Hungarian legislation is supposedly based. 
1.4.3 Summary 
Overall, while EU standards on refugee protection and integration of immigrants have had some 
positive impact in Eastern Europe, the rhetoric of protection has remained more or less restricted to 
the government and NGOs. On the other hand, standards of control and restriction have been 
applied, and the corresponding rhetoric has received wide circulation. Compared to these, the 
adoption of standards on anti-discrimination is seen as less pressing. During accession negotiations, 
European Union bodies concerned with control and restriction have carried more weight and more 
funding than those focused on rights, resulting in a picture more skewed in favor of control and 
restriction compared to the EU’s internal debates. The priorities are clearly reflected in funding 
allocations. Within the framework the EU-financed 1997, 1998 and 1999 PHARE programmes for 
Hungary in the domain of immigration, $47 million of Union funds were spent on the upgrading of 
border guard and police equipment, compared to $2 million on the asylum system (Aszalós 
2001:202). In Poland, over €430 million of PHARE funding has been allocated for the 1994-2006 
period for upgrading police and border control, with no mention of asylum facilities (Kaczmarczyk 
2001:229), making up 8% of all EU grants to Poland in 1998 (Stola 2001:197). In Estonia and 
Latvia, PHARE allocated some €2 million in total to integration programs targeted at Russian 
 
9 See Mayakinfo.ru, 14 August 2002, http://www.mayakinfo.ru/news.asp?msg=6389. 
10 See Mayakinfo.ru, 23 September 2002, http://www.mayakinfo.ru/news.asp?msg=6836. 
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speakers, but these focused on the cultural integration of citizens, mostly language education (Open 
Society Institute 2002:208, 320-21). As a result, the perception of the needs for harmonization in the 
legislative domain related to xenophobia is unbalanced: controls are deemed important, while rights 
and freedoms are not. As an author noted about Hungary, the region has become “a shield protecting 
Western Europe… by the local implementation of the anti-migration policies of the European 
Union” (Aszalós 2001:201). 
An additional problem with this approach is that the EU’s community framework on migration is 
far from being established. The European Commission’s 2000 Communication on a community 
migration policy is the basis of continuing high-level efforts by the Commission to create a more 
balanced system of migration responding to the desires of migrants and economic needs of member 
states as well as to the drive to crack down on “illegal” migration and “transnational crime”. The 
game, in other words, is far from over. As outlined in Section 1.3, Poland and the Czech Republic 
have begun moving closer to this two-pronged approach. These states will be in a better position to 
influence the shaping of the community policy. Hungary has yet to show any interest in that. Clearly, 
while restrictions have been justified by the needs to “harmonize” with the EU, the difference has to 
do with differing judgments of domestic political expediencies and differing public discourses in the 
accession states. 
1.5 Summary 
Since the mid-nineties, in large part due to preparations to enter the European Union, immigration 
legislation in Central Eastern Europe has become both more restrictive and more coherent. Although 
Hungary has been a front-runner in developing such legislation, other accession countries have by 
now developed similarly comprehensive laws. Hungarian legislation, in comparison, provides for a 
somewhat more restrictive treatment of asylum seekers and a significantly lower degree of legal 
security for permanent residents.  
Overall, the legal frameworks of the Eastern European countries leave room for the growth of 
xenophobia not only, and probably not mainly, because of their patchiness, internal contradictions, 
and lack of integration provisions, but because their structure and language largely reflects a 
conception of non-citizens as a group to be controlled. Another part of the legislative aspect of the 
problem is that immigration laws allow officials too much discretion, sometimes to the point of 
disregarding them. Finally, anti-discrimination and “hate crime” legislation works poorly overall and 
is not applied to non-citizens. 
Regardless of the actual (small) number of immigrants and refugees, the legislation and the 
dominant political discourse on foreigners spawn an institutional spirit that goes beyond the legal 
limits of discrimination between citizens and non-citizens and permits administrative treatment of 
foreigners that is humiliating, discriminative, tendentious, and frequently illegal. International or 
national legal instruments are insufficient to protect individuals from this. As a prominent 
immigration solicitor in Hungary said, “with aliens, they can do what they want”. It is this spirit more 
than explicit laws or policies that reinforces in autochthonous populations the sense that migrants are 
by virtue of that act suspect, not quite legitimate, and not equal members of society. In migrants, it 
perpetuates a sense of vulnerability and discourages them from seeking redress. To quote the same 
solicitor, “a foreigner, especially an Asian, won’t sue the authorities even for the gravest violation of 
rights.”11 The development of such an institutional spirit may be the result of the legacy of the 
restrictive and unaccountable bureaucratic spirit of state socialism combined with the emergence of 
 
11  Interview with Károly Nagy, Budapest, 6 November 2002. 
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political xenophobia in the early nineties, which allowed the retention of these characteristics in 
immigration bodies when they were no longer acceptable in other spheres of public administration. 
The examples of Poland, the Czech Republic, and to an extent Slovakia and Slovenia, however, 
suggest that alternative public discourses can be developed, to the point of influencing this 
institutional spirit, when either the executive, the political establishment, or civil society possess 
sufficient will and strength to put them on the agenda. In Hungary, this has not been the case. As a 
result, in comparison to these countries, Hungary has developed and retained a more monolithically 
xenophobic political and public discourse, even though it had started out with a public administration 
that had more of a “human face” than that of its neighbors. 
Encouragingly, it appears that Hungary’s Minister of the Interior recognized this when she asked 
the Government’s Population Policy Committee to evaluate xenophobia in Hungary and pay 
particular attention to whether immigration and asylum authorities perform the function they should 
be expected to in combating it. This appears to be part of a broader effort to tackle the sources of 
xenophobia, which includes a task force at the Ministry of Justice, a survey of opinions of foreign 
students commissioned by the Ministry of Education, visits of high-profile politicians including the 
Chairman of Parliament to a refugee camp before Christmas 2002, and the announcement in 2003 of 
the formation of a task force to develop a policy of immigrant integration. The task force’s brief stated 
that “the government wants to offer equal opportunities to all those who legally live in Hungary, 
including newcomers with a different cultural and ethnic background” (Integration of Refugees and 
Immigrants, Tender MAT02/HU/9/3. Amsterdam: Radar, November 2002). 
2 .  Mea su r emen t s  o f  X enophob i a  
2.1 Data from Individual Countries 
To go beyond the usual blanket statements about and simplistic explanations of the growth in 
xenophobia, we need both to go beyond abstract theorizing and to look critically at what sociological 
surveys actually tell us. We need to ask, in particular, to what extent the dynamics and manifestations 
of xenophobia in various East European countries have been similar or different. If they have, can we 
pinpoint the reasons and agency behind the differences? Does the absence of racist violence, for 
example, mean less intolerance or just a different kind? If so, why? What is the relationship between 
violence and intolerance? Such comparative questions, in turn, raise the question to what extent 
methods used to measure xenophobia in different countries are comparable. 
Most of the surveys on ethnic intolerance in Eastern Europe target relations between indigenous 
majority and minority ethnic groups, or even more generally, attitudes toward ethnic, sexual, and 
lifestyle minorities all lumped together (see Turai and Tóth 2002). Some of these include questions of 
a more general nature, and often, the distinction between specifically xenophobic versus generally 
intolerant attitudes is hard to make. For instance, a 1998 survey found that only 36% of Latvians 
would accept non-Latvians as friends or family members (Bogushevich and Tsilevich 2002). Two-
thirds of Slovenes and 61% of Slovaks would reject such a possibility; also, 61% of Slovenes described 
themselves as at least “somewhat racist” in an early 2000s survey (Školkay 2002). In a national poll in 
Russia in 1996, 41% of respondents “had a negative attitude” to members of other nationalities, but 
in a separate poll in St. Petersburg, 58% of respondents were not opposed to a family member 
marrying a person of a different nationality (Sikevich 1999:104, 107). Nonetheless, since these studies 
are usually phrased with a focus on one or several “indigenous” groups, their indicativeness of a 
general level of xenophobia is questionable. An increasing number of studies, however, focus 
specifically on attitudes to foreigners. 
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In Hungary, sociologists have administered surveys since 1989 to “measure” attitudes to 
foreigners (primarily to refugees), “social distance”, and perceptions of their numbers (see review in 
Turai and Tóth 2002). The most long-standing study that specifically aims at monitoring xenophobia 
is a survey conducted by Endre Sik and co-workers since 1992. In this survey, representative samples 
of Hungary’s adult population (between 1,000 and 1,500 respondents) are asked whether Hungary 
should accept all, some, or no refugees (Figure 1). In May 2003 (not shown in the figure), the share 
of «no one» answers was unchanged, 25% (Sik and Tóth 2003).  
 
Of those who would admit some refugees, depending on who they were, only 22 to 29% would 
admit Arabs, Afghans, and Gypsies, and only around 33% would admit Romanians or Chinese (Sik 
and Simonovits 2002). In other words, when asked for ethnic preferences, even those who would 
admit refugees conditionally show themselves as intolerant toward most ethnic groups.  
Sik et al. suggest that the overall growth of those rejecting asylum seekers has to do with the 
appearance of refugees from the Yugoslav wars and their portrayal in the media. Preference for 
unconditional rejection correlated positively with age, lack of education, low income, disability, 
unemployment, disinterest in politics (non-voters), dissatisfaction with the country’s economic 
situation and with the respondents’ own economic and social position, and negative or skeptical 
attitude to NATO membership. By contrast, there was little difference between voters for the two 
large political parties (nationalists and socialists) (Sik and Simonovits 2002; Fábián, Sik, and Tóth 
2001:404, 409).  
Csepeli and Örkény asked a series of questions on attitudes to immigration within the framework 
of the International Social Survey Program in 1995; Sik and co-workers repeated these in 1999. In 
both years, 73% of respondents agreed that immigration increased criminality, and 52% in 1999 
(down from 63% in 1995) agreed that immigrants took jobs away from locals. Only 18% (down 
Figure 1 























































Source: Sik and Simonovits 2002 (Courtesy Endre Sik) 
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from 21%) agreed that immigration had economic benefits (in 1995, just under half of the 
respondents had agreed that Hungary needed the immigrants’ labor), and 8% (down from 9%) 
agreed that it opened up Hungary to new ideas and cultures (Fábián, Sik, and Tóth 2001:405). 
Combining and weighing responses to these questions resulted in a value of 3.76 on a five-point 
xenophobia scale, with 1 being least and 5 being most xenophobic (Fábián, Sik, and Tóth 2001:406). 
In 1999, Sik and co-worker also found that 51% of respondents of a representative base of 1,524 
negatively evaluate the free movement of European Union citizens to Hungary after the country’s 
accession to the EU (Fábián, Sik, and Tóth 2001:410), showing that xenophobia is not limited to 
migrants from “the East”. (Another study of attitudes toward foreign investors shows that motivations 
are both economic (“reducing jobs,” “taking profits out of the country”) and ideological (“selling out 
the country”, “squeezing out Hungarian products”) (Duránszkai and Lengyel 2001). In a 2000 
attitude survey conducted by Tárki on a base of 3,000, two-thirds of respondents thought there were 
too many foreigners in Hungary. A study of attitudes to various groups using the Bogardus scale in 
1997 showed that 50 and 53% of Hungarians would respectively oppose their close relatives marrying 
Romanians or Chinese (Murányi 1998:159). Only one 1999 study came to more optimistic 
conclusions: 46% of respondents agreed that “immigrants are not only beneficial for the economy but 
also enrich our everyday lives,” while only 16% disagreed (Kapitány and Kapitány 1999:57).  
Three earlier surveys among secondary school students revealed much higher levels of acceptance. 
In one, around 80% agreed that anyone willing to integrate into Hungarian society and learn the 
language and culture should be able to settle in Hungary (Erős 1998). Another gave more 
contradictory results: over half of respondents did not reject any particular group and agreed that 
“diversity enriches us,” but they reproduced a higher level of rejection of Chinese, Arabs, and 
Romanians, over 85% agreed that immigrants took the jobs of Hungarians, and 90% agreed that they 
increased criminality (Szabó and Örkény 1998). In a third, 1996 study, over 80% agreed that 
everyone should live in the country of her or his choice, and around three-quarters agreed that “it is 
our duty to accept immigrants” (Csepeli and Szabó, cited in Turai and Tóth 2002). No comparable 
surveys have been conducted more recently. 
In 1998, 48% of Czechs agreed that people of a different “race” or skin color are “definitely” or 
“somewhat” second-rate citizens in a country, but 68% said they were never prejudiced against people 
of other “races”, and in the previous year, 52% would allow anyone whose life was under imminent 
threat to settle in the Czech Republic. Although the last question is similar to that asked by Sik and 
co-workers in Hungary, the difference in formulations makes a comparison difficult. In these surveys, 
negative attitudes correlated positively with residence in rural areas and areas with a high 
concentration of migrants. Unlike in Hungary, the age group most rejecting of foreigners was those 
under 19. In 1999, respectively 44% and 52% of Czechs expressed a negative attitude to people from 
the Balkans and the former Soviet Union (Drbohlav 2001:214). But between 1997 and 1999, the 
share of people with negative attitudes toward foreigners declined (Drbohlav 2001:215). 
In Poland, Ukrainians, Russians, and particularly Romanians have been at the bottom of the 
sympathy scale in attitude surveys since the early 1990s. Dariusz Stola (2001:193) connects this to the 
fact that these nationalities represent the majority of foreign shuttle traders, workers, and beggars. In 
the early 1990s, 15% of Poles agreed that there were superior and inferior races, and 57% of them 
named blacks as an “inferior race” (Jasinska-Kania 1999:78). In 1994, 41% of Poles favored 
restrictions on immigration, and 73% had a negative opinion of labor immigration, citing a threat to 
jobs, outflow of capital, and a threat to security (Iglicka et al. 2003:392). In 1998, most respondents 
supported newly introduced restrictions on the entry of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, 
motivating this by security concerns. 92% agreed that the settlement in Poland of foreigners who 
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married Poles should be facilitated; 66% agreed with the same for foreign “experts and scholars”, 25% 
for construction workers, and 11% for petty traders (Stola 2001:193). 
In Russia, the Centre for Public Opinion Research has conducted surveys of attitudes toward 
different nationalities since 1989. Among the foreign nationalities listed in the survey, a large share of 
negative answers was obtained only for Azerbaijanis and Armenians, but it dropped from 43 and 45% 
respectively in 1993 to 39 and 35% respectively in 1995 and 1997, while the share of positive 
attitudes rose from 43 and 41% to 49 and 46%. The share of positive attitudes to “Negroes” grew 
from 50% in 1990 to 60% in 1997, although the share of negative attitudes also grew from 9 to 19%. 
Overall, negative attitudes peaked in the early nineties (Gudkov 1999:48), but negative attitudes to 
people from the Caucasus, particularly Chechens, rose again after the explosions in Moscow in 2000, 
which the government attributed to Chechen terrorists. In the wake of the events, 65% of Muscovites 
agreed that all people from the Caucasus should be deported from the city (Lokshina 2002:92). 
Comparing the studies, Sikevich (1998:110-11) claims that negative attitudes to migrants correlate 
negatively with education and social status, but positively with the size of the settlement in which 
respondents live, i.e., city dwellers are more xenophobic than villagers. She speculates that this may 
reflect a positive correlation between xenophobia and exposure to migration. Contrary to the 
Hungarian researchers, Sikevich (1999:111) found a strong negative correlation between xenophobia 
and age in St. Petersburg: whereas 39% of those over 55 had a negative attitude to members of other 
nationalities, 70% in the 18-25 age group did.  
Along with these large-scale surveys, a number of qualitative, anthropological studies have also 
been made. In Hungary, these have mainly concerned attitudes towards ethnic Hungarians and 
refugees from the Yugoslav wars (see review in Turai and Tóth 2002). Already the earliest study, in 
1989, reported that nearly half of the ethnic Hungarians interviewed complained about hostile 
reactions ranging from name-calling to physical attacks (Sik 1990). Sik and co-workers found that the 
share of respondents who believe that ethnic Hungarian migrants from Romania deserve help 
decreased from 85% in 1989 to 38% in 1999, while that of those who think they take jobs from the 
local population increased from 26% to 41%, and that of those who think “they are not really 
Hungarians” increased from 11% to 21% (Fábián, Sik and Tóth 2001:409). In Russia, a number of 
studies have been done of the attitudes of the local population toward several groups of migrants, 
including Chinese, ethnic Russians from neighboring countries, and migrants from the Caucasus. In 
three studies conducted in the late nineties by Zaionchkovskaia and Vitkovskaia (Gelbras 2001:151), 
Larina (1999:95), and Gelbras (2001:144-173), around 20% of those polled expressed negative 
attitudes toward Chinese migrants. Gelbras notes (2001:150) that although the prevalence of positive 
attitudes correlates positively with income, unemployed respondents did not have a more negative 
view, which he explains by the fact that Chinese traders provide some of them with odd jobs as well as 
cheap consumer goods. In a survey of 125 students in Irkutsk, Siberia, over half gave negative 
characteristics in response to open questions about migrants from the Caucasus and one-third about 
Chinese (Palyutina 1996:343). 
Vitkovskaia and Zaionchkovskaia (1999:114) conclude that reasons provided for negative 
opinions towards the Chinese are mostly abstract and pertain to some future danger of mass 
immigration.12 Indeed, 74% of residents polled by them (Vitkovskaia and Zaionchkovskaia 
1999:115) and two-thirds of those polled by Larina (1999:96) think that Russia faces a “Chinese 
threat”, and two-thirds of Palyutina’s (1996:343) respondents thought there were too many Chinese 
in the city. Perhaps for this reason, while nearly 80% agree that Chinese should be allowed to trade in 
 
12  Gelbras, however, found that negative attitudes usually had personal motivations such as “they occupy housing,” “they 
transfer money abroad,” “they live better than we do” (Gelbras 2001:147). 
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Russia, they almost unanimously oppose allowing them to purchase real estate or even lease land on 
long-term contracts (Vitkovskaia and Zaionchkovskaia 1999:114, Larina 96). While a full 55% of 
students – perhaps given the scarcity of well-paid jobs in Siberia – would like to work for a Chinese 
entrepreneur, 38% would not like to have a Chinese neighbour (Vitkovskaia and Zaionchkovskaia 
1999:116); and four-fifths of residents are opposed to their close relatives marrying Chinese 
(ibid:115). Similarly, in Gelbras’s survey (2001:154), only 6% agreed that Chinese should have the 
right to be naturalized, 11% agreed to a right to permanent residence, 15% to a right to purchase real 
estate, and less than half of the respondents thought that Chinese should have the right to legal 
representation in court. Palyutina (1996:344) found that students saw Chinese as “dirty” and 
“speculators”. Dyatlov summarizes Siberians’ view of Chinese migrants as “useful but potentially 
dangerous second-class people” (1999:90). Migrants from the Caucasus are also seen as “speculators” 
who “want to get rich at our expense,” but also as more directly threatening because they are 
“criminals” who are “cruel” and “disrespectful toward Russian people” (Palyutina 1996:344, Sikevich 
1999:107-09). 
In 1997-98, Vitkovskaia (2002) also studied attitudes towards resettlers from the rest of the 
former Soviet Union of 120 to 200 local residents in each of five rural areas of European Russia. A 
year later, she repeated the study in one of the areas and found that the share of negative views 
towards resettlers had doubled from 22% to 44%. Vitkovskaia concluded that this leap was due to the 
effects of the August 1998 currency crisis, which adversely affected the labor market. Respondents 
motivated their negative attitudes by fears that migrants would take away jobs, housing, and land, and 
by the opinion that the migrants were richer than they. The evaluation of locals’ perceptions by the 
resettlers themselves, of whom groups of similar size were polled, was more positive. Vitkovskaia’s 
explanation was that migrants’ perception is shaped primarily by acts of hostility, of which there had 
been few. When asked about migrants of different ethnic groups, the only group for which the share 
of negative attitudes (which Vitkovskaia calls “tolerance ratio”) was significantly higher than for 
ethnic Russians was migrants from the Caucasus, towards whom 28% of those polled held a negative 
attitude, whereas no other ethnic group elicited more than 1% negative comments. These findings 
support Vitkovskaia’s conclusion that, unlike in the case of the Chinese in Siberia, “migrantophobia” 
toward Russian resettlers is caused more by specific (real or perceived) economic disadvantages (or 
their perception) than by abstract ideas, with attitudes to migrants from the Caucasus somewhere in-
between.  
Very few studies have focused on the nature of specific conflict situations between migrants and 
the local population. Dyatlova (1998) applied the Rosenzweig test to a group of fifty Siberian 
students. In this test, respondents are asked to imagine themselves in a situation of frustration caused 
by another person, which is depicted in a cartoon. When the “frustrator” was given a Chinese name, 
the number of aggressive reactions, the likelihood to blame the other party, as well as to attribute the 
situation to ethnic traits of the “frustrant” increased. Examples of reactions are: “If she weren’t at least 
half an hour late, she wouldn’t be Chinese!” “There are liars in China, but not in Russia.” “I am 
surprised that my girlfriend doesn’t refuse to go to a dance with a Chinese.” 
Contrary to Hungary and Russia, studies in Poland suggest an increasing acceptance of 
immigration: 41% of  a representative sample in 1999 agreed that foreigners should be allowed to 
settle in Poland, compared to 17% in 1996 and 29% in 1998 (Kaczmarczyk 2001:209).  
2.2 Comparative Data 
Studies aiming to measure xenophobia in a comparative fashion in various Eastern European 
countries include the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 1995), which covered 22 countries; 
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a 1998 survey by the New Democracy Barometer, which covered a somewhat different range of 
countries (notably without Russia) and combined questions on anti-Semitic, anti-Gypsy, and 
xenophobic attitudes; and the 1990 and 1999 European Value Study, which covered “personal,” 
“ethnic,” and “political intolerance” across Europe including Russia. The first two studies are 
summarised in Fábián, Sik, and Tóth 2001:408; the last, in Halman 2001.  
Of the countries covered in all three studies, Hungary consistently appears as the country with the 
most negative overall indicators. In the ISSP survey, 52% of Hungarian respondents “strongly agreed” 
that immigration increased criminality, and 41% “strongly agreed” that immigrants took away locals’ 
jobs. Also, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Russians opposed legalizing the purchase of land by foreigners 
most strongly. Combining variables directly or indirectly related to xenophobia, the authors of the 
survey calculated Hungary’s “xenophobia score” at –0.82 and Latvia’s and Bulgaria’s at –0.78, while 
Russia’s at –0.35, East Germany’s at –0.14 and Poland’s at –0.12. The first three thus come out as 
“world leaders” in xenophobia, while Russia scores close to Italy, and Poland and East Germany are 
similar to Norway (Csepeli and Örkény 1998). In the New Democracies Barometer study, 45% of 
Hungarian respondents were classed as “strongly xenophobic” (on the basis of agreeing with at least 
21 of 29 anti-Semitic, xenophobic, or anti-Gypsy statements). In the 1999 European Value Study, 
Hungary had the highest intolerance indices in all three tolerance categories, its ethnic intolerance 
index (which included an attitude to immigrants variable) being 0.57, almost twice as high as that of 
next-placed Lithuania (0.31). A 2002 survey, whose results are still to be published, again put 
Hungary on the top (Örkény 2002).  
Beyond this, however, the surveys diverge. The ISSP survey shows Bulgaria, along with Hungary, 
as the most xenophobic country by a wide margin among all surveyed. All other Eastern European 
countries have scores comparable to some Western European countries (25 to 30% believing in 
immigration as source of criminality and 20 to 25% in migration causing loss of jobs). Hungarians, 
Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks are also least likely to consider immigration as an economic or cultural 
benefit (Csepeli and Örkény 1998). The New Democracy Barometer ranked Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Croatia rather near Hungary (with 41, 38, and 34% “strongly xenophobic” 
respondents respectively), while Belarus, Romania, Ukraine, and Slovakia were less xenophobic, with 
values respectively of 27, 24, 23, and 20%. By contrast, “ethnic tolerance” indexes of the European 
Value Study placed most Eastern European countries at the bottom of the European scale. As 
mentioned, Hungary formed a block in itself as the most intolerant. Indices for Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Belarus, Poland, Estonia, Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovenia ranged from 0.31 to 
0.21, covering a tier that also included Greece and Italy. The next tier, which contained the bulk of 
Western European countries, included only Russia and the Czech Republic (between Belgium and 
France with a value of 0.18) as well as Latvia, number five on the European scale with 0.12. 
The European Value Study made a further important point: that ethnic tolerance in Latvia, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia increased between 1990 and 1999, but in 
Poland, Russia, Estonia, Belarus, Lithuania, and Hungary, it decreased. The change was sharpest in 
Hungary, which plummeted from being the second most ethnically tolerant country in Eastern 
Europe in 1990 to being the most ethnically intolerant one in 1999. By contrast, the Czech Republic 
decreased its ethnic intolerance index from 0.31 in 1990 to 0.18 in 1999; Latvia, from 0.23 to 0.12; 
and Slovenia, from 0.39 to 0.21. It is noteworthy that in 1990, all three countries were part of 
multiethnic states in the process of ethnic fission, which took place in the following year without 
major destabilizing effects. There are no comparable structural explanations to the negative change in 
Hungary, however. 
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3 .  Con c l u s i on s  and  R e c ommenda t i on s  
3.1 Cautionary Remarks 
Since data from quantitative surveys are often used and abused in politics and the media, several 
cautionary remarks are first in order. As we have seen, if we look simply at the rankings and indices of 
xenophobia provided by large-scale sociological surveys, they contradict each other on most accounts. 
For example, Latvia appears as one of the most xenophobic countries in the 1998 ISSP and as one of 
the least xenophobic in the 1999 European Value Study. This serves as a strong reminder that the 
figures provided by such studies can only be used if the technique of constructing the variables and 
the qualitative context of the survey is taken into account. For the latter, there is a need for more in-
depth studies using anthropological or psychological methods.  
The same caution is in order for smaller-scale, single-country surveys, which usually provide more 
information about the motivation of respondents. For instance, in what Sik and co-workers’ call their 
survey of xenophobia in Hungary, the question they ask is about “refugees,” a concept that cannot be 
assumed to be equated to that of “foreigners”. For different respondents, “refugee” can be both more 
positive (because of the humanitarian associations) and more negative (because a refugee is assumed to 
be an economic burden and possibly a socially destabilizing factor). Turai and Tóth (2002) also 
question whether the lumping together of foreigners with groups seen as socially deviant (drug 
addicts, homosexuals, people with a police record) in some surveys does not condition respondents to 
give lower ratings of sympathy to all groups involved. 
Non-representative polls add depth to the picture, but are often erroneously used to draw 
quantitative conclusions. In addition to methodological questions of a general nature – for instance, 
Sikevich’s study (1999) reports neither the time of the poll, its base, nor the criteria of selection! – 
some have errors of interpretation. In Gelbras’s survey of attitudes toward Chinese, he mistakenly 
concludes that rejection of the idea of creating Chinatowns reflects rejection of their long-term 
residence (Gelbras 2001:153). Drbohlav’s (2001:214) conclusion that the agreeing that a citizen of a 
different skin color is a second-rate citizen reflects xenophobia is also questionable. 
3.2 Conclusions 
Having noted that there are few definitive statements about rankings or trends that the results of the 
three large-scale comparative surveys put together would support, we can nonetheless make interesting 
observations about popular beliefs regarding xenophobia in Eastern Europe that none of the surveys 
support.  
First of all, the surveys refute the simplistic but popular notion that Eastern Europe is a 
homogeneously xenophobic region (either because of its state socialist heritage or its history of ethnic 
conflict, or a combination thereof). Indeed, differences in levels of xenophobia between individual 
Eastern European countries are as great as between individual Eastern and Western European 
countries. Furthermore, changes in the levels of intolerance since the transition to electoral 
democracies and free market have not gone in the same direction across Eastern European countries: 
they have risen in some but declined in others.  
Second, explanations of xenophobia typically focus on economic and/or cultural (historical, 
“civilizational”) factors. Economic explanations suggest that citizens of those countries that have 
suffered the most from the post-socialist transition should be most xenophobic, in particular in 
responding to the question about the correlation between immigration and unemployment. Cultural 
or historical explanations assume that current ethnic intolerance is a repetition of historical precedents 
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of ethnic or religious conflict or a consequence of some essentialized cultural traits, and that it is less 
likely to occur in countries with a stronger liberal democratic tradition. It follows from both the 
economic and cultural explanations that relative levels of intolerance should not change rapidly 
between countries. Yet according to the surveys, they do, and economic and cultural explanations do 
not work in explaining either the relative levels or the changes. 
Economic explanations would generally suggest that that xenophobia should be higher in the 
post-Soviet states, Bulgaria, and Romania, which have the lowest per capita incomes, or, within the 
Central Eastern European group, Poland, which has both the lowest incomes and the highest 
unemployment. Historical or “civilizational” explanations have also frequently pointed to the post-
Soviet states and the Balkans as carrying a legacy of ethnic hatred. But of these countries, only 
Bulgaria appears consistently at the more xenophobic end of the studies. Conversely, several countries 
in the more xenophobic half of the New Democracy Barometer and the European Value Study are 
economically better off than those in the less xenophobic half. And the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
which have similar levels of income, urbanization, education, and unemployment, find themselves 
wide apart.  
Third, neither a positive nor a negative correlation between xenophobia and the volume of 
immigration or the fact of sudden influxes of migrants is borne out by the data. Hungary and 
Bulgaria have lower foreign populations per capita than Russia and the Czech Republic; Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic experienced more sudden immigration than Russian; yet Hungary 
and Bulgaria appear to be more xenophobic than the Czech Republic and Russia.  
That economic and cultural/historical explanations do not account for the divergence between 
Eastern European countries suggests that we should pay more attention to the role of politics and 
public discourse, as outlined in earlier sections. Hungary’s level of xenophobia is, by all accounts, high 
and rising; Slovenia’s is low and falling. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland are somewhere in 
between but have a falling level of xenophobia. These countries are generally seen as sharing much in 
common (geographic location, socio-demographic structure, relatively high pre-1989 living standards, 
relatively strong civil society, position as candidates for first-wave EU accession). They also have 
obvious differences. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia are products of (violent or non-
violent) ethnic conflict within the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; Poland and Hungary have 
not undergone such recent changes. Income levels in this group of countries vary relatively 
significantly. Slovenia has had a succession of liberal post-Communist governments in contrast to the 
other countries where such governments alternated with nationalistic ones. Perhaps more important 
in terms of explaining the difference in trends in xenophobia, however, is that, as we have seen, in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and to a lesser extent Slovakia, the government, the political 
establishment, or civil activists have made some efforts in introducing a pro-migrant discourse into 
mainstream media alongside existing (and still dominant) xenophobic imagery. This has not 
happened in Hungary.  
This study does not undertake to uncover the reasons why this has been the case. The absence of 
sufficiently strong critical voices here and their presence there may well have much to do with simple 
accident. Their appearance in Hungary, however, has certainly been hindered by the mainstreaming 
of ethnocentric and nationalistic discourse in Hungary in the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Such 
discourses have at times dominated other countries in the region – notably Slovakia, Romania, and 
Croatia – but they appear to have been more clearly tied to particular leaders. In Hungary, by 
contrast, the rhetorical de-territorialization of “the nation” has been accepted across the political 
spectrum, so that the term now commonly denotes a boundless ethno-cultural entity to which the 
state is somehow tied. The discourse of history, which, in Hungary, had been rather self-critical before 
1989, has strongly shifted towards victimization since. Thus, if in 1989, over one-third of adult 
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respondents to a survey thought that Hungary had caused harm to Yugoslavs, Romanians, Czechs and 
Slovaks, only around 10% of teenage respondents in 1992 thought so, while over one-third thought 
those peoples had caused harm to Hungary, up from 10-20% in the 1989 survey (Csepeli 1992:200-
203, Csepeli and Závecz 1995:149-150). While imagery of national victimhood has been part of 
mainstream public visual culture in various Eastern European states in recent years, at the moment, 
nowhere is it as prominent at the moment as in Hungary, where the map of “Greater Hungary” is 
omnipresent from classrooms to bumper stickers.  
3.3 Recommendations 
If political agency and discourse do indeed have a greater effect on trends in xenophobia than is 
usually believed, then governments and legislatures also have more opportunity and responsibility to 
take steps against xenophobia. These can include: 
• Developing comprehensive migration policies with a transparent system of criteria for visas, 
temporary and permanent residence; safeguards for human and family rights and cultural and 
social entitlements; incentives to invest and work in sectors corresponding to the country’s needs; 
incentives to learn the local language and participate in civic life; and checks to ensure the 
payment of taxes and duties. The burden of coordination between visas, residence and work 
permits, trade licenses, etc. must rest on the state, not on the applicant. Most of these 
recommendations are contained in European Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003, 
European Commission Communications COM(2000)757, COM(2001)127, COM(2002)225, 
and COM(2003)336, and Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2000)15. 
• Consulates and immigration bodies should operate customer service centers providing easily 
accessible information and advice on application procedures in languages accessible to migrants, 
in person and by telephone. The processing of applications should be expedited and, if necessary, 
higher fees should be introduced, but these must be standard and public, and there should be no 
additional charges. Authorities’ deviation from procedural rules (requesting documents not 
specified in laws, exceeding processing deadlines) should be sanctioned. National immigration 
agencies should be separated from border enforcement and police, and their personnel should not 
be recruited or seconded from law-enforcement bodies. In addition, they should have supervisory 
boards consisting of government officials, academics, representatives of NGOs, and migrants, 
with the task of ensuring the desired functioning of the system and investigating abuses. Most 
importantly, officials in the immigration service must be educated to see themselves as experts in 
the management of diversity rather than as security guards. Many of these recommendations are 
contained in Epting 2002. 
• Changing public discourse to de-criminalize migration; enforcing media ethics codes by boards 
examining text and images, and publicizing the names of violators. Migrants should be included 
in boards overseeing these activities. Education and cultural policy, in particular the teaching of 
history, should recognize diversity, including that created by migration, as a norm and a source of 
enrichment, as recommended in two Council of Europe Declarations (Council of Europe 2001, 
2003). State-sponsored promotion of culture and tourism should draw attention to the 
contributions of migrants to the development of urban scapes. Tolerance campaigns should 
include a focus on migrants. 
• Extending the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws and other instruments of minority 
protection to foreign citizens. Communicate to them the meaning of such laws. Access to social 
welfare, employment, housing, education, medical care, and participation in public and cultural 
life should be secured for long-term foreign residents regardless of legal status, as stated in 
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European Council Communication COM(2001)127 and Council of Europe Recommendation 
Rec(2000)15.  
• Including migrants in the scope of social integration policies. This includes programs targeting 
civic and cultural participation as well as education of the majority population. Migrants should 
be invited to boards overseeing urban development, trade and culture in municipal areas of their 
concentrated residence. 
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